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It is trite law that, upon the grant of a pastoral lease which is
indistinguishable from the pastoral leases examined inWik, the Crown does
not acquire a beneficial reversionary interest, with the result that the
underlying title of the Crown continues to be mere radical title. This does not,
however, resolve the legal position with respect to other leases: in particular,
the Wik High Court made it clear that the pastoral leases in question were
not leases in the common law sense. This two-part article, therefore,
examines the legal implications of the High Court’s treatment of the
reversion expectant argument for common law leases. Although the High
Court’s decision in Ward has confirmed that, as a result of the Native Title
Act 1993 (Cth), the grant of such leases extinguish native title, does this
necessarily mean that any residuary rights to the land in respect of which the
lease was granted automatically lie with the Crown? Part I begins by
examining whether, on general principles, the High Court’s identification of
radical title as both a postulate of the doctrine of tenure and a concomitant
of sovereignty support or undermine Brennan J’s reversion expectant
dictum. The relevance of traditional English interpretations in determining
the meaning of radical title and reversion expectant, in light of Brennan J’s
dictum, is also analysed.
In Part II it will be seen that the rationales underlying the majority judgments
in Wik indicate how the legal implications, for the Crown’s title, of the
statutory grant of interests in land other than pastoral leases, including the
grant of a true common law lease, might be resolved. The question
examined in Part II is twofold: does the Crown grant of a common law lease
based upon its radical title mean that the Crown acquires the reversion
expectant on the expiry of the term? And, if it does, is such reversion
expectant sufficient to convert the Crown’s radical title into beneficial
ownership of the land? Put another way, is the traditional common law
definition of ‘reversion’ relevant when a lease is granted out of land in
respect of which the Crown has mere radical title? Further light is thrown on
this question by examining the common law doctrine of extinguishment by
freehold grant and the common law concepts of partial extinguishment and
suspension.
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1
Introduction
One of the main legal arguments in Wik Peoples and Thayorre People v
Queensland1 was based on Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’ theory espoused
in Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2):2 namely, whether the grant of a
pastoral lease over land subject to native title changed the underlying title of
the Crown by creating a reversion expectant, thereby converting the Crown’s
underlying title from mere radical title to full beneficial title, such that upon
expiry of the term of the pastoral lease, full beneficial ownership would revert
to the Crown. It is trite law that the majority of the Wik High Court rejected
this argument; the majority denied that the Crown acquired a beneficial
reversionary interest upon the grant of the relevant pastoral leases, with the
result that the underlying title of the Crown continued to be mere radical title.3
Nevertheless, the majority in Wik also made it clear that the rights of the
grantee of a pastoral leasehold estate could be inconsistent with the continued
enjoyment of native title and, to the extent of the inconsistency, the native title
interest must yield. Thus, although a reversion expectant did not apply to
confer beneficial ownership upon the Crown in respect of the pastoral leases,
any native title in respect of the relevant land might be extinguished on the
ground of inconsistency with the grantee’s title. This conclusion did not,
however, resolve the legal position with respect to other leases: in particular,
the Wik High Court made it clear that the pastoral leases in question were not
leases in the common law sense.
What are the implications, therefore, of the High Court’s treatment of the
reversion expectant argument for common law leases? To date, there is no
authoritative decision on the issue from the High Court. Indeed, although the
majority of the High Court in Western Australia v Ward4 held that a common
law lease extinguished native title, this was based on the court’s application of
the inconsistency of incidents test for the purposes of the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth) (NTA), rather than on an expansion of the Crown’s radical title at
common law. Furthermore, in Fejo v Northern Territory,5 although reference
was made in argument to the reversion expectant theory, this theory was not
1 (1996) 187 CLR 1; 141 ALR 129 (Wik).
2 (1992) 175 CLR 1; 107 ALR 1; 66 ALJR 408 (Mabo). In Mabo, Brennan J discussed how
native title can be extinguished by a Crown grant which vests in the grantee an interest in
land which is inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy a native title in respect of the
same land, stating that (at CLR 68): ‘[i]f a lease be granted, the lessee acquires possession
and the Crown acquires the reversion expectant on the expiry of the term. The Crown’s title
is thus expanded from a mere radical title and, on the expiry of the term, becomes a plenum
dominium’. See also CLR 49. In Wik, above n 1, Brennan CJ, as author of the minority
judgment, reiterated these comments (at CLR 154). For a detailed discussion of the
‘reversion expectant’ theory, see U Secher, A Conceptual Analysis of the Origins,
Application and Implications of the Doctrine of Radical Title of the Crown in Australia: an
Inhabited Settled Colony, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, UNSW, 2003, Part 2 of Ch 4.
3 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 128, 129 per Toohey J; 155 per Gaudron J; 189 per Gummow J;
244–5 per Kirby J. The implications of the Wik decision for the Crown’s title on the grant
of any interest in land is examined by the author: Secher, above n 2, Ch 4.
4 (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1 (Ward).
5 (1998) 195 CLR 96; 156 ALR 721; 72 ALJR 1442 (Fejo). In that case, the subject land
included land in respect of which the Northern Territory had granted Crown leases
containing a condition that permitted the lessee, on completion of development in
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addressed by the court, as the question in that case concerned an earlier grant
in fee simple, not the later lease of the land. Thus, the High Court did not have
to consider whether the Crown’s title became a plenum dominium upon the
lease coming to an end.6
This two-part article, therefore, examines the legal implications for the
Crown’s title of granting a true common law lease? Although it is clear that,
as a result of the NTA,7 the grant of such leases extinguish native title, does
this necessarily mean that any residuary rights to the land in respect of which
the lease was granted automatically lie with the Crown? In other words, is
native title extinguished by the grant of a common law lease because of an
expansion of the Crown’s radical title or because of inconsistency between the
interest granted and the continued enjoyment of native title? It will be seen, in
Part II, that the rationales underlying the individual judgments in Wik indicate
how the justices might resolve the legal implications, for the Crown’s title, of
the statutory grant of interests in land other than pastoral leases, including the
grant of a true common law lease.
Indeed, the question examined in Part II is twofold: does the Crown grant
of a common law lease (whether pursuant to statute or at common law) based
upon its radical title8 mean that the Crown acquires the reversion expectant on
the expiry of the term? And, if it does, is such reversion expectant sufficient
to convert the Crown’s radical title into beneficial ownership of the land? Put
another way, is the traditional common law definition of ‘reversion’ relevant
when a lease is granted out of land in respect of which the Crown has mere
radical title? Does the grant by the Crown of a common law lease relying upon
its radical title confer beneficial title to the leased land or does it merely confer
a nominal proprietary interest sufficient to support the lease? Moreover, since
all powers of alienation of interests in land in Australia are now governed by
statute,9 the critical question becomes: what is the role, if any, of the concept
of reversion expectant in the context of a grant by the Crown made pursuant
to statute?
accordance with the terms of the lease, and payment of any sum owing to the Territory, to
surrender the lease in exchange for a freehold title at no further cost.
6 Fejo, ibid, at [55]: ‘. . . there is no question of the Crown becoming entitled to both
ownership and possession of the land upon the lease coming to an end. . . . The questions
about leasehold interests that were considered in [Wik] do not arise’.
7 Under Div 2B of Pt 2 of the NTA, a ‘previous exclusive possession act’ attributable to the
Commonwealth or a State or Territory is confirmed as extinguishing native title totally:
ss 23C and 23E. In determining what grants constitute a previous exclusive possession act,
the legislature adopted a two-fold approach. First, the NTA provides that certain general
types of grants have extinguished native title: ss 23B(2)(c)(ii)–(viii), ss 23B(3) and (7). In
this context, the NTA lists any lease that confers a right of exclusive possession as a previous
exclusive possession act: s 23B(2)(c)(viii). Secondly, a Schedule to the NTA contains certain
specific types of grants which the relevant governments considered, on the basis of the
common law, had conferred exclusive possession and had therefore extinguished native title:
ss 23B(2)(c)(i), 249C and Sch 1. The Schedule primarily contains reference to residential,
commercial, community purpose and agricultural leases. It includes leases granted under
State or Territory law since as early as 1829. See also corresponding State and Territory
legislation.
8 That is, in respect of land not part of the Crown’s demesne.
9 Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Pty Ltd v Chalk [1975] AC 520 at 533; 4 ALR 438; Wik, above n 1,
at CLR 91 per Brennan CJ; 189 per Gummow J.
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Answering these questions involves a consideration of the implications, for
the Crown’s title on the grant of a common law lease, of the High Court’s
treatment in Wik of the reversion expectant theory and Brennan CJ’s further
suggestion in Wik that the grant of any estate in land necessarily confers full
beneficial ownership on the Crown. It also involves an examination of how the
subsequent decisions of Western Australia v Ward10 and Wilson v Anderson11
have interpreted Wik and applied the propositions from Wik to common law
leases and leases granted in perpetuity respectively. The fundamental
questions in these later cases were framed in terms similar to those considered
in Wik and consequently focused on whether the leases conferred a right of
exclusive possession and, if they did, whether native title rights were
extinguished or suspended. Inherent in the examination of these later cases,
therefore, is a consideration of the common law doctrine of extinguishment by
Crown grant. In particular, it will be seen that the common law concepts of
partial extinguishment and suspension and the test for extinguishment by
freehold grant suggest that upon the grant of any estate (including a common
law leasehold estate), the Crown does not acquire a beneficial reversionary
interest.
Before examining these specific issues, however, Part I begins by
examining whether, on general principles, the High Court’s identification of
radical title as both a postulate of the doctrine of tenure and a concomitant of
sovereignty support or undermine Brennan J’s reversion expectant dictum.
Since all members of the Wik High Court discussed Brennan J’s dictum and,
in doing so, reviewed the relevance of traditional English interpretations in
determining the meaning of radical title and reversion expectant, Part I also
analyses this aspect of the Wik decision.
Part 1: Common law implications of the ‘reversion
expectant’ argument: General principles
A The two limbs of radical title:
1 Radical title as the postulate of the doctrine of tenure: a bare
legal title
Although Brennan J’s reversion expectant dictum has been interpreted to
suggest that the grant of a common law lease extinguishes native title, it in fact
refers to the Crown’s title, on becoming a plenum dominium, as having the
extinguishing effect.12 Accordingly, it is not the title acquired by the lessee
which affects native title. The majority of the High Court in Wik have,
however, made it clear that, although the Crown’s radical title does not expand
into full beneficial ownership upon the statutory grant of a pastoral leasehold
estate, the rights of the grantee of such a leasehold estate can nevertheless be
10 At trial and appellate levels: (1998) 159 ALR 483 (trial); (2000) 99 FCR 316; 170 ALR 159
(FC); (2002) 213 CLR 1; 191 ALR 1 (HC).
11 At trial and appellate levels (1999) 156 FLR 77 (trial); (2000) 97 FCR 453; 171 ALR 705
(FC); (2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313 (HC).
12 See North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corp v Queensland (1995) 61 FCR 1 at 29; 132 ALR 565
at 591. See also Gurubana-Gunggandji People Determination (1995) 123 FLR 462 at 475–6
and R H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 2000, p 269.
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inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of native title and, to the extent of
the inconsistency, the native title interest must yield. Significantly, however, it
will be seen that the majority judges in Wik were split 2:2 on the question of
whether the Crown actually acquired a reversionary interest upon the grant of
a pastoral lease.13
Nevertheless, the majority’s conclusion that radical title did not confer a
beneficial reversionary interest is consistent with the fundamental common
law role, as declared by the majority of theMabo High Court,14 of radical title
as the postulate of the Australian doctrine of tenure. The Mabo High Court
made it clear that the practical effect of radical title being vested in the Crown
is to enable the system of private ownership of estates held of the Crown to
be observed.15 The system of private ownership of estates held of the Crown,
however, rests not only on the doctrine of tenure but also on the doctrine of
estates.16 As a legal concept, the doctrine of estates explains the interests of
those who hold from the Crown, not the title of the Crown itself.17
Accordingly, the rights conferred on a grantee by a particular estate may be
inconsistent with native title notwithstanding that the Crown does not have,
and never had, any beneficial title to the granted land.
That is, although the Crown’s radical title does not confer a beneficial title
on the Crown in respect of land subject to native title, it does allow derivative
title to pass to the grantee. In this way, the rights that a particular estate confers
on a Crown grantee may be inconsistent with the continuance of any native
title rights and, to the extent of the inconsistency, extinguish the native title
rights. Thus, native title is extinguished as a result of the operation of the
doctrine of estates, not the doctrine of tenure. Put another way, native title is
extinguished by the real title of the grantee, not the fictional title of the Crown.
Significantly, this conclusion is consistent with the decision inMabo: since the
essence of that decision lies in saying that the Crown’s fictional title cannot
preclude the existence of native title, it logically follows that such fictional
title cannot, of itself, extinguish native title.
Accordingly, Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’ dictum contradicts his own,
as well as the rest of the Mabo High Court’s, explanation of the legal origins
and purpose of radical title.18 According to Brennan J’s analysis, the effect of
radical title as a postulate of the doctrine of tenure is to give the Crown a
paramount lordship over all who hold a tenure granted by the Crown. The
effect of radical title as a concomitant of sovereignty is twofold: first, it
enables the Crown, in exercise of its sovereign power, to grant an interest in
land to be held of the Crown and, secondly, it enables the Crown to acquire
13 See section on ‘Wik, Radical Title and the Reversion Expectant’: text immediately following
n 45 below.
14 See generally Secher, above n 2, Ch 3.
15 Ibid: Ch 3, esp p 135.
16 Brennan CJ has described these two doctrines as the ‘interlocking doctrines of tenure and
estates’: Wik, above n 1, at CLR 90.
17 See Wik, above n 1, at CLR 128 per Toohey J.
18 See Secher, above n 2, pp 202–3. It will also be seen that Brennan J’s dictum contradicts his
own views on the common law doctrine of extinguishment of native title by Crown grant:
see section on ‘Extinguishment of Native Title by Crown grant’, text commencing
immediately before n 130 below.
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land for the Crown’s demesne.19 The Crown’s paramount lordship, therefore,
constitutes the feudal aspect of radical title, whereas the Crown’s general
power of alienation constitutes the sovereignty aspect of radical title.
Importantly, it is the sovereignty aspect of radical title that links the two limbs:
as a concomitant of sovereignty, the Crown’s radical title confers power to
grant land in every part of Australia, including land subject to interests not
deriving from Crown grant. In this way, radical title as a postulate of the
doctrine of tenure has the potential to give the Crown a paramount lordship
over all land.
Indeed, it was in order to assure the Crown the rights attached to its
paramount lordship that the dual fiction that the Crown was originally in
possession, and therefore owner, of all land and that all titles to land were
derived from Crown grant, was invented.20Accordingly, the doctrine of tenure
is concerned primarily with feudal relations. In the context of the postulate of
the doctrine of tenure limb of radical title, the fiction of original Crown
ownership was invented to explain how the feudal relationship arose. That is
the fiction’s purpose. Indeed, all members of theMabo High Court recognised
that the purpose of radical title was to enable the doctrine of tenure to apply
in Australia.21 The extent of radical title as a postulate of the doctrine of tenure
should, therefore, be limited to the minimum necessary to support the doctrine
of tenure. The effect of the doctrine is to create a tenurial relationship between
the Crown and the grantee; where there is no grant by the Crown, no feudal
relations exist. Thus, the Crown’s radical title cannot be used to claim its
rights as paramount lord over land in respect of which the Crown has not
exercised its sovereign power to grant an interest in land.
Similarly, in the context of the concomitant of sovereignty limb of radical
title, although the Crown’s general power of alienation supports the plenary
title of the Crown, such a result is only possible ‘when the Crown has
exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to itself ownership of parcels of
land within the Crown’s territory’.22 Thus, this limb cannot be used to claim
land in respect of which the Crown has not exercised its sovereign power in
this way.
Pre-Mabo, of course, it is clear that, as a result of the universality of the
fiction of original Crown ownership, the law was able to justify the Crown’s
feudal claim to a paramount lordship over all lands by deeming all holdings
by subjects to be derived from royal grants. Nevertheless, the effect of the
feudal fiction was simply to give the Crown its rights as feudal lord. Although
all land was deemed to be held of the Crown, feudal theory never adopted the
19 Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 48 per Brennan J. In the case of land subject to native title, the
right to acquire property rights takes the form of an exclusive right of pre-emption: see
Secher, above n 2, Ch 2, p 96; Ch 3, pp 170–1.
20 At common law, if the King was not in possession, he could not grant the land. At best he
had a right to acquire possession of it, assuming he had such a right, and then only expressly:
Winchester’s Case (1583) 3 Co R 1a at 4b–5a. This issue is explored further by the author:
Secher, above n 2, Ch 7.
21 Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 48 per Brennan CJ; 212 per Toohey J; 80 per Deane and
Gaudron JJ.
22 Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 50 per Brennan J.
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theory that the Crown ‘owned’ all the land.23 The Crown was seised of the
land, not in demesne but in service; that is, the seisin of the Crown was in law
rather than in deed. This sort of seisin was also attributed to a reversioner, who
was in reality a lord with a tenant below him.24
Indeed, seisin in law, being a mere technical seisin, has never been
sufficient, without more, to vest possession in and thus confer beneficial
ownership on the Crown.25 Crucially, however, in the context of leases, an
estate in reversion does automatically vest in possession as soon as the term
of the lease expires.26 For present purposes, therefore, the question that needs
to be addressed is whether the grant by the Crown of a common law lease
relying upon its radical title requires the creation of a reversion and, if it does,
whether the reversion, when ultimately vested in possession, confers a
beneficial title. It will be seen that the answer to the question differs according
to whether it is resolved in the context of the pre-Mabo feudal doctrine of
tenure or the post-Mabo redefined doctrine of tenure.
It is clear that once the Crown has exercised its sovereign power, at
common law, to grant an interest in land not part of its own demesne, the land
is brought within the regime governed by the doctrine of tenure and the fiction
of original Crown ownership is invoked. Consequently, when the Crown
grants a leasehold estate out of land in respect of which the Crown has mere
radical title (that is, before the Crown has acquired an actual title to the land),
the common law vests a reversionary interest in the Crown in order to support
and enforce the relationship of landlord and tenant. Although this reversionary
interest will be supplied by virtue of the application of the fiction of original
Crown ownership, the fiction is only invoked to achieve the intended grant, it
does not apply to confer title on the Crown.27
When the Crown’s radical title is merely a right of reversion,28 it has merely
a right to acquire or regrant title when the grantee’s estate comes to an end.29
That is, although the Crown effectively loses its radical title for the duration
23 A W B Simpson, A History of the Land Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp 1, 47.
24 F Pollock and F WMaitland, 2 The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd
ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, p 39.
25 See Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, pp 426–9.
26 K E Digby, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1875, p 186. See also Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, text accompanying n 147.
27 See Secher, above n 2, Ch 3, text accompanying n 308; see also Ch 1, p 25. While this was
strictly also the position under feudal theory, where the Crown granted a lease over
unalienated land pre-Mabo, the fiction of original Crown ownership was deemed to confer
a full beneficial reversionary interest: see text in paragraph immediately before n 37 below.
28 When land has been granted to a subject, the Crown’s radical title is merely a right of
reversion or a right to acquire title in accordance with its well established prerogative rights
to escheat, bona vacantia and forfeiture. These rights are part of the sovereign’s jura regalia
and fall to the Crown as part of his prerogative title: Attorney-General of Ontario v Mercer
(1883) 8 App Cas 768 at 778 (PC). This concept is further examined by Secher, above n 2,
Ch 7, pp 425–9.
29 On the question of the Crown’s title where land escheats to the Crown, see W Blackstone,
2 Commentaries on the Laws of England: Of the Rights of Things, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, p 245; Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, pp 425–30. Cf K McNeil,
Common Law Aboriginal Title, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p 218, Ch 3, n 60 and
accompanying text to the effect that the doctrine of tenure can result in an actual title where
land escheats to the Crown.
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of the grant (but retains its power of eminent domain),30 it has a right to
acquire or regrant title when the grant determines. This right to acquire or
regrant title does not, however, mean that the Crown is seised in demesne:
indeed, since the reversion expectant is vested in interest, the right to
possession, seisin in demesne, arises in the future.31 Furthermore, although the
fiction of original Crown ownership supports the reversionary interest at
common law, once the term of the lease expires, the fiction is spent. Thus, the
Crown’s fictional reversionary interest does not automatically vest in
possession.32 Rather, once the grant determines, the nature of the Crown’s title
returns to its essential character before the fiction of original Crown ownership
applied; the Crown’s right which returns to it does not lose its essential
character: it has always been dominium minus plenum or nuda proprietas.33
It is, therefore, the Crown’s radical title that automatically vests in possession.
Indeed, this is simply another way of saying that unless the Crown’s
possession and title are original, the Crown only has possession because it has
title.34
Thus, for the Crown to acquire a plenary title upon the expiration of the
lease (that is, for a beneficial interest to vest in possession) there must be an
appropriate exercise of sovereign power. Although the rights that a particular
lease confers upon a lessee might be inconsistent with native title and, to that
extent, extinguish it, this does not affect the proposition that radical title,
without more, does not allow the Crown to assume ownership of any residuary
rights to the land. Indeed, even in the case of escheat, the Crown’s technical
seisin had to be completed by entry in order for the Crown to acquire actual
possession and thus title.35 This required entry or, if the land was vacant, an
office entitling the Crown to possession was sufficient without entry.36 Under
the doctrine of escheat, therefore, the Crown simply took back what it had
30 For a discussion of the Crown’s eminent domain, see Secher, above n 2, Ch 5, pp 390–6.
31 See Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, pp 428–30.
32 In any event, the fiction of original Crown ownership never conferred title on the Crown: see
above n 23. Nevertheless, as a result of the fiction of original Crown ownership applying and
the grantee being in possession, the Crown arguably has a form of vicarious possession for
the duration of the grant: see Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, p 425. Cf the situaton where the
Crown has acquired beneficial ownership of land before the grant of a leasehold estate. In
such a case, the Crown’s reversionary interest would, on the expiration of the lease,
automatically vest in possession.
33 That is, the interest will ‘come back’: Pollock and Maitland, above n 24, p 21. It is worth
noting that the grant of seisin determines whether an estate is held in possession, remainder
or reversion, and leasehold estates were not recognised as affecting seisin under the feudal
system of land tenure: De Gray v Richardson (1747) 3 Atk 469; 26 ER 1069 (Ch); Wakefield
and Barnsley Union Bank Ltd v Yates [1916] 1 Ch 452 (CA). Although this is undoubtedly
correct in theory, ‘in practice “leases have long since achieved the status of estates, and
therefore it is common and correct to speak of a landlord’s reversion”’: Megarry and Wade,
The Law of Real Property, 5th ed, Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, 1984, p 237.
34 This concept is explored by Secher, above n 2, Ch 7.
35 See Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, pp 425–9.
36 As the right of forfeiture also requires the right of re-entry to be exercised (A J Bradbrook,
S MacCallum and A P Moore, Australian Real Property Law, LBC Information Services,
Sydney, 1997, at [12.54]–[12.57]; P Butt, Land Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney,
1996, pp 368ff) and is cited by Blackstone as an example of when an office of inquest was
necessarily employed (Blackstone, above n 29, p 258: see also Secher, above n 2, Ch 7, text
accompanying n 130), the same conclusion with respect to escheat would apply to forfeiture.
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before the intervening, but now ceased, rights of the tenant: that is, its radical
title; a fortiori the reversion expectant.
Thus, unless the Crown has full beneficial ownership of leased land
immediately prior to the grant of the lease, the estate in reversion which the
Crown acquires does not automatically confer beneficial ownership when the
lease determines; the Crown’s interest which vests in possession upon the
expiration of the lease is the same interest which the Crown had immediately
prior to the grant of the lease: radical title. Put another way, although an estate
in reversion is vested in interest, it is nevertheless an existing interest.
Pre-Mabo, of course, irrespective of whether a leasehold estate was granted
out of the Crown’s demesne or out of land in respect of which it is now clear
that the Crown had a mere radical title, conventional legal theory attributed a
full beneficial reversionary interest to the Crown. That is, where necessary the
fiction of original Crown ownership was deemed to confer a full beneficial
reversionary interest. This result was, no doubt, because, pre-Mabo, the feudal
doctrine of tenure did not distinguish between a lease granted out of the
Crown’s demesne land and a lease granted out of land in respect of which the
Crown had mere radical title. Post-Mabo, however, the traditional common
law definition of reversion, based on the assumption that sovereignty
conferred absolute beneficial ownership of all land upon the Crown, is only
relevant in the context of a leasehold estate granted out of land forming part
of the Crown’s demesne. Where the Crown grants a lease based upon its
radical title, the fiction of original Crown ownership only supplies a nominal
proprietary interest to support the lease granted for the duration of its term.
That is, the meaning of reversion in this context is different from the
traditional common law meaning: reversion means the resumption of radical
title.
2 Radical title as a concomitant of sovereignty: No legal
requirement for a reversion expectant to support a lease by the
Crown37
Although a private individual who carves out an estate (whether in a term of
years or any other interest in land) must do so out of a larger estate and the
larger must be sufficient to support the creation of the lesser, these limitations
do not apply to the sovereign power exercising sovereignty. Thus, although a
reversion expectant is implied by law when the holder of a freehold estate
grants only part of that estate,38 the Crown’s radical title is sufficient to create
37 There is another basis for denying any legal requirement for a reversion expectant to support
a lease: namely, because a lease is a chattel interest. Leasehold tenure played no part in the
scheme of tenures which existed at common law. Having developed relatively late, it stood
outside the feudal system, and thus is both historically and legally separate: Megarry and
Wade, above n 33, p 14 n 7. Cf J Williams, Principles of the Law of Real Property,
Re-arranged and partly rewritten by T Cyprian Williams, 23rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1920, p 364: ‘So in the case of a lease for years, the lessee upon entry becomes
tenant to the lessor, and the relation of the one to the other is also called a tenure; although
. . . this relation was treated as lying outside the law of free tenure’. There is only one feudal
tenure left today, namely socage, now called freehold. The one field in which the rules
derived from tenure remain of practical importance is, however, paradoxically leasehold.
38 It was assumed that a fee simple had been created: Blackstone, above n 29, p 175.
The ‘reversion expectant’ argument — Pt 1 9
an interest for a term of years without requiring the creation of a reversion
expectant. Indeed, the High Court has made it clear that, contrary to the
pre-Mabo view, the exercise by the Crown of the right to grant tenure in land
is not dependant upon the Crown’s beneficial ownership of the land. Unless
the Crown has more than mere radical title to the land, therefore, the Crown
does not have, nor need, a freehold estate when a lease is created.39 Since the
Crown’s radical title is an aspect of its sovereignty, it is sufficient to create an
interest in land without requiring a beneficial interest in the land.
Thus, where the Crown does not enjoy beneficial ownership of land when
a lease is created by the Crown, upon the expiration of the lease the land
reverts to its previous legal status, land over which the Crown has a mere
radical title, and the Crown once again has the capacity to grant interests in
that land.40 The Crown does not require a beneficial interest to create an
interest and the creation of an interest which has subsequently expired does
not alter that position. There is no legal requirement for a reversion expectant
to support a Crown lease where the land leased was not, immediately before
the lease was created, part of the Crown’s demesne, and none is created.
3 Summary
While it appears that the two limbs of radical title contradict one another, at
common law the two limbs are not mutually exclusive when land has been
alienated: both limbs apply contemporaneously. Thus, although the postulate
of the doctrine of tenure limb dictates that a reversion is created upon the grant
of a leasehold estate, the concomitant of sovereignty limb dictates that such
reversion merely confers a nominal proprietary interest sufficient to support
the lease for its duration. Thus, the High Court’s identification of radical title
as both a postulate of the doctrine of tenure and a concomitant of sovereignty
provides two legal bases for denying, on general principles, that the Crown
acquires a beneficial reversionary interest upon the grant of any lease. By
definition, therefore, the High Court’s conception of radical title is
inconsistent with Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’ dictum.
Importantly, however, while radical title supported the Crown’s sovereign
powers at common law to grant interests in land to itself and others, these
prerogatives have since been displaced by statutory powers.41 Accordingly,
the legislative regimes for regulating the alienation of interests in Australian
land now constitute a sufficient source of the same power. This is crucial
because the consequences of radical title as a postulate of doctrine of tenure
may be irrelevant to the grant of an interest pursuant to statute. Indeed, it will
be seen that at least two members of the majority inWik considered that where
the grant of leases is regulated by statute, notions of the common law apt for
39 Cf Blackstone, above n 29, pp 165–6.
40 Indeed, for the duration of the grant the Crown retains the power to deal with the land
pursuant to its right of eminent domain, another attribute of its sovereignty. The concept of
eminent domain is examined by Secher, above n 2, Ch 5.
41 The provisions in the various State and Territory Crown Lands Acts take away the
prerogative right of the Crown to grant land: Attorney-General v Cochrane (1970) 91 WN
(NSW) 861 at 865 per Jacobs JA. See also Secher, above n 2, Ch 4, text accompanying
n 295.
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tenurial holdings under the Crown should not be introduced.42
Thus, although it has been demonstrated, in the context of the postulate of
the doctrine of tenure limb of radical title, that a reversion is a present interest
which gives a future right to seisin and cannot, therefore, create a new and
different interest in the reversioner, this conclusion may be otiose in the
context of the statutory grant of a lease. Instead, the concomitant of
sovereignty limb of radical title may dictate that the Crown can create an
interest for a term of years without requiring the creation of a reversion
expectant. This is crucial: while the new common law definition of reversion,
in the context of the grant of a lease based upon radical title, as a nominal
proprietary estate sufficient to support the lease granted, rejects feudal notions
and thus embraces the less fictional role of the redefined doctrine of tenure in
Australian land law,43 the conclusion that no reversion is necessary to support
the statutory grant of any lease by the Crown represents a rejection of the role
of the redefined doctrine of tenure. Nevertheless, whether a reversion,
consisting of a nominal proprietary estate, is created or no reversion is created,
the result is the same: in either case, upon the expiration of a lease, the
Crown’s interest in the land does not lose its essential character; it continues
to be a mere radical title.
Although this is the legal position based on general principles deduced from
the High Court’s identification of the two limbs of radical title, it will be
instructive to examine how the High Court in Wik specifically dealt with
Brennan J’s reversion expectant dictum and his further suggestion (as Chief
Justice and author of the minority judgment inWik) that the grant of any estate
in land necessarily confers full beneficial ownership on the Crown. Indeed, it
will be seen that notwithstanding the High Court’s subsequent decision in
Western Australia v Ward,44 Wik continues to be authoritative not only in the
context of the nature of the Crown’s title at the expiration of a lease, but also
in the context of the common law doctrine of extinguishment.45
B Wik, radical title and the reversion expectant
The concept of radical title arose for reconsideration in Wik as a result of the
court’s examination of the consequences for native title of the expiration of a
pastoral lease, namely, whether native title rights were thereby extinguished
permanently or whether such rights were merely suspended.46 One of the
specific legal arguments in Wik was based on Brennan J’s ‘reversion
expectant’ theory espoused in Mabo. All members of the High Court,
therefore, discussed Brennan J’s dictum and, in doing so, reviewed the
relevance of traditional English interpretations in determining the meaning of
radical title and reversion expectant.
42 Gummow and Kirby JJ: see text accompanying nn 76–89; 90–96 below.
43 In particular, ensuring that the fiction of original Crown ownership does not operate to
confer beneficial ownership on the Crown when it exercises the right to grant a leasehold
estate based upon its radical title.
44 Above n 4.
45 That is, the majority of the High Court in both Ward, above n 4 and Wilson v Anderson
(2002) 213 CLR 401; 190 ALR 313, resolved the issues before them by reference to the
NTA rather than the common law. Indeed, the majority of theWilson High Court emphasised
that the ‘common law’ test of extinguishment is ‘exemplified in Wik’: at [47].
46 N Bhuta, ‘Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management’ (1998) 22 MULR 24 at 33.
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1 Majority judgments
(a) Toohey J
Toohey J approved of Brennan J’s explanation, in Mabo, of the content of
radical title as being a bare nominal title only; essentially a power of
alienation. In support of this approach, Toohey J cited with approval the
following passage by Brennan J in Mabo:
Recognition of radical title of the Crown is quite consistent with recognition of
radical title to land, for the radical title, without more, is merely a logical postulate
required to support the doctrine of tenure (when the Crown has exercised its
sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support the plenary title of the
Crown (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to itself
ownership of parcels of land within the Crown’s territory).47
Consequently, Toohey J found it difficult to accept the argument based upon
Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’ dictum. To support his decision to reject this
aspect of Brennan J’s approach, Toohey J referred to both limbs of radical
title. In the context of the concomitant of sovereignty limb, Toohey J declared
that although it was clear from the judgments in Mabo that the attribution of
radical title to the Crown was a necessary concomitant of its sovereignty over
Australia and thus empowered the Crown to grant interests in land,48 ‘radical
title does not of itself carry beneficial ownership’.49 Accordingly, the grant of
an estate in land does not require the Crown to assume beneficial ownership
of the land. Nor was such a result dictated by the relevant legislation.50 Thus,
although the radical title lies with the Crown immediately before the grant of
a pastoral lease, Toohey J questioned the relevance of speaking of the Crown
acquiring the ‘reversion’ in such a case and of the Crown’s title becoming a
‘plenum dominium’.51
As a postulate of the doctrine of tenure, however, radical title enables the
Crown to become Paramount Lord of all who hold a tenure created by Crown
grant: the common law, therefore, vests a reversionary interest in the Crown
in order to support and enforce the relationship of landlord and tenant.
Nevertheless, Toohey J found that the invocation of reversion and plenum
dominium, as those expressions are usually understood, did not lie easily with
the position of the Crown under the relevant statutes.52 His Honour referred to
the traditional definition of a reversion as ‘the interest which remains in a
grantor who creates out of his own estate a lesser estate’.53 Toohey J noted,
however, that the ‘doctrine of estates is a feudal concept in order to explain the
interests of those who held from the Crown, not the “title” of the Crown
itself’.54Accordingly, Toohey J was of the view that to speak, in relation to the
47 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 128, citing Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 50 per Brennan J.
48 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 127.
49 Id.
50 Id. See also Kirby at CLR 244 and North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corp v Queensland (1995)
61 FCR 1 at 29; 132 ALR 565 at 591 per Lee J.
51 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 128.
52 Ibid, at CLR 129.
53 Ibid, at CLR 128, citing B A Helmore and G W Millard, The Law of Real Property in New
South Wales, 2nd ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1966, p 227 (emphasis added).
54 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 128.
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position of the Crown under the relevant statutes, of a reversion expectant on
the expiry of the term of the lease as expanding the Crown’s radical title to a
plenum dominium was to apply the concept of reversion to an unintended
end.55
In Toohey J’s view, therefore, to argue that the Crown, on granting a lease,
acquires a ‘beneficial reversionary interest’ in the land, which ‘ensures that
there is no room for the recognition of native title rights, is . . . to read too
much into the Crown’s title’.56 His Honour referred to the ‘curious paradox’
involved in the proposition enunciated by Brennan J in Mabo:
if it is the reversion which carries with it beneficial title, why is that title not there
in the first place? And if it is the existence of that beneficial title which extinguishes
native title rights, why were those rights not extinguished before the grant of a
pastoral lease?57
Toohey J reasoned that if the Crown never possessed the beneficial title, a
fortiori, there could be no reversion of such title to it. Accordingly, the
‘reversion’ was not a reversion of the kind normally associated with leases.
‘Reversion’ was, therefore, distinguished from its traditional common law
meaning58 and held to connote the resumption of the character of ‘Crown
Land’.59
Toohey J reconciled the two limbs of radical title by emphasising that such
a result in no way detracted from the doctrine of sovereignty as the Crown
could, upon determination of the lease, deal with the land as authorised by
statute.60 In the context of the relevant statutes, Toohey J observed that ‘once
a pastoral lease came to an end, the land answered the description of “Crown
Land” and might be dealt with accordingly’.61 Thus, on the expiration or other
termination of a pastoral lease, it is still the radical title of the Crown that must
be considered in relation to native title rights.62According to this analysis, the
meaning of ‘Crown Land’ in the relevant statutes is merely land which the
Crown has radical title to.
Although Toohey J’s decision was made in the context of a statutory lease
not given its content by the common law, because his analysis is based on the
initial nature of the Crown’s title, that is, its radical title, rather than the nature
of the interest granted, there is no reason why it would not apply to any lease
granted pursuant to statute, including a common law lease. Indeed, this aspect
of Toohey J’s reasoning represents the main point of departure from
Gaudron J’s judgment.
(b) Gaudron J
Although approaching the issue from a different perspective, Gaudron J
adopted a view of radical title similar to Toohey J’s. Unlike Toohey J,
however, Gaudron J did not address the common law position; her Honour
55 Id.
56 Ibid, at CLR 129.
57 Id.
58 Ibid, at CLR 128.
59 Ibid, at CLR 128–9.
60 Ibid, at CLR 128.
61 Ibid, at CLR 128–9.
62 Ibid, at CLR 129.
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referred specifically to provisions of the Land Act 1910 (Qld).63 In particular,
s 135 of the 1910 Act provided for a statutory reversion in the event of
‘“determinat[ion] by forfeiture or other cause before the expiration of the
period or term for which it was granted”, [and specified] that in that event it
should “revert to His Majesty and become Crown land”, able to be dealt with
under [the]Act accordingly’.64 In Gaudron J’s view, the effect of this provision
was to ‘assimilate’, in the event of forfeiture or early determination, the
previously alienated land to land which had not been alienated.65 Thus, the
previously alienated land became once more ‘Crown Land’, which Gaudron J
defined as ‘land in respect of which the Crown had radical title, and not land
in respect of which [the Crown] had beneficial ownership’.66 Accordingly,
Gaudron J also suggests that both prior to alienation of any land in Australia
and upon early determination of a pastoral lease, the Crown has only a radical
title to the land without any beneficial interest.
Gaudron J concluded that the relevant pastoral leases were not true leases
in the traditional common law sense because they did not confer a right to
exclude native title holders and, thus, did not confer a right of exclusive
possession.67 For Gaudron J, therefore, it followed that the pastoral leases did
not operate to vest a leasehold estate. Consequently, since a reversionary
interest only arises on the vesting of a leasehold estate, there was no basis for
the contention that, on the grant of the leases, the Crown acquired a
reversionary interest which operated to expand its radical title to full beneficial
ownership.68
Thus, Gaudron J denied the applicability of the concept of a common law
reversion to interests created by statute where those interests are not given
their content by the common law. Instead, her Honour found that the statutory
reversion which applied in such cases entitled the Crown to radical title only;
not to any beneficial interest in the land. Although Gaudron J reached the same
conclusion on the facts as Toohey J, the underlying rationale of her decision
was based not on the nature of the Crown’s radical title but on the character
of the particular grant. Thus, since the relevant pastoral lease did not operate
to vest a leasehold estate, a statutory rather than a common law reversionary
interest applied.
This analysis bears a very close resemblance to an argument advanced by
Lee J in North Ganalanja v Queensland.69 Although noting that ‘the exercise
by the Crown of the right to grant tenure in land based upon a radical title does
not, in itself, require the expansion of radical title to a full beneficial estate’,70
Lee J nevertheless considered when the grant by the Crown of any interest in
land would require the Crown to assume beneficial ownership of that land to
make the grant. He explained that:
63 Hereafter referred to as the 1910 Act.
64 Ibid, at CLR 156.
65 Or reserved or dedicated for public purposes.
66 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 156.
67 Ibid, at 155.
68 Id.
69 (1995) 61 FCR 1 at 29; 132 ALR 565, esp at ALR 591–2.
70 Ibid, at FCR 29; ALR 591.
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Whether the Crown has so acted depends upon whether the character of the estate
or interest granted by the Crown is dependent upon, and can flow from nothing less
than, absolute beneficial ownership by the Crown. It may be said that the grant of
a lease for pastoral purposes over waste lands does not require that the estate as
granted must proceed from a Crown title of absolute beneficial ownership. It is not
the equivalent of the grant of a lease by the holder of a freehold estate. An
unqualified grant of a leasehold estate in closely settled land in which the delivery
of exclusive possession is fundamental to the purpose of the grant of the lease, may
bring different considerations.71
According to Gaudron and Lee JJ’s analysis, therefore, although all land in
Queensland, and indeed in Australia, is regulated by statute, so that all
interests in land are granted by the Crown pursuant to legislation, where the
interest granted is equivalent to an interest recognised by the common law, the
common law doctrine of reversion may apply.
Furthermore, while addressing the terms of the Land Act 1962 (Qld),72
Gaudron J observed that s 299 (2) required that, on forfeiture or early
termination, the lessee of a pastoral holding was to give possession to the
Crown.73 Her Honour concluded that ‘the terms of s 299(2), requiring that
possession be given to the Crown, point in favour of a statutory interest on
forfeiture or early termination extending beyond radical title’.74 Radical title,
therefore, emerges as an ‘elastic concept’which expands or retracts depending
on the intention of the Crown as discerned from the statutory provisions
regulating the creation of interests in land. Thus, Gaudron J’s decision has
important implications for the title of the Crown where the interest granted
pursuant to legislation is given its content by the common law.75
Significantly, in this context, it appears that Gaudron J’s (and indeed
Lee J’s) concept of a common law reversion has its traditional common law
meaning. This is because although Gaudron J distinguished between a
common law reversion and a statutory reversion, her concept of a statutory
reversion only connotes something different from a common law reversion
where the particular interest granted is not given its content by the common
law. Thus, unlike Toohey J, Gaudron J does not distinguish between a
traditional common law reversion and a reversion in the context of the
Crown’s mere radical title (whether statutory or common law). Indeed, it has
been seen that it is because Toohey J makes this distinction that his analysis
is relevant to any interest granted by the Crown where the Crown has a mere
radical title immediately before the grant.
71 Id.
72 Hereafter referred to as the 1962 Act. Which applied to the Holroyd lease.
73 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 162.
74 Ibid, at CLR 165.
75 Gaudron J noted that although ss 135 and 299 of the 1910 and 1962 Acts respectively appear
to have provided exhaustively for the situation obtaining on forfeiture or early determination
of a pastoral lease, there was no equivalent provision providing for the situation where a
lease determined at the expiration of the term for which it was granted: Wik, above n 1, at
CLR 146. In such circumstances, however, the definition of ‘Crown Land’ in the Acts was
apposite. Because the definition of Crown land excludes land which is ‘for the time being’
subject to a lease, it followed that upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the land
reassumed the character of Crown Land; that is, land in respect of which the Crown has
radical, rather than beneficial, title: s 4(c) of the 1910 Act. This would, therefore, appear to
mirror the common law position.
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Nevertheless, both Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that although a reversion
was created, it did not confer full beneficial ownership. In this way, they
distinguished a statutory reversion from the traditional common law meaning
of reversion. Significantly, Gaudron J’s suggestion that a statutory reversion
can, in some circumstances, have the traditional common law meaning results
from the rationale underlying her approach; a rationale which differs from that
underlying Toohey J’s approach. On one hand, the rationale underlying
Toohey J’s approach combines arguments based upon the two limbs of radical
title. Thus, although radical title as a concomitant of sovereignty does not
require the creation of a reversion, as a postulate of the doctrine of tenure, it
does. In such circumstances, however, reversion necessarily has a meaning
which differs from the traditional common law definition. On the other hand,
the rationale underlying Gaudron J’s approach is not based on the nature of
radical title but on the character of the particular Crown grant. Since a pastoral
lease is an interest created by statute and not given its content by the common
law, it does not operate to vest a leasehold estate. Consequently, the concept
of a common law reversion (within the traditional pre-Mabo meaning or the
post-Mabo meaning) was simply inapplicable. Instead, a statutory reversion
entitling the Crown to radical title only applied.
The crucial point, however, is that although their reasoning differed, both
Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that a reversion was created by the grant of the
relevant pastoral leases. This is in stark contrast to Gummow and Kirby JJ
who held that no reversion was created at all in the context of statutory grants.
It will be seen that although the rationale underlying the approach of these
Justices is based exclusively on the concomitant of sovereignty limb of radical
title, there is an important difference between their judgments: while the
rationale is expressly stated in Gummow J’s judgment, it is only implied in
Kirby J’s.
(c) Gummow J
Gummow J’s conclusion on the meaning and content of radical title is similar
to that expressed by both Toohey and Gaudron JJ. In particular, Gummow J
adopts Brennan J’s common law interpretation of radical title as a ‘bare
nominal title’ only and not as an underlying estate conferring beneficial
ownership except to the extent of the rights attaching to native title. For
Gummow J, radical title is ‘“a postulate to support the exercise of sovereign
power within the familiar feudal framework of the common law” . . .
[including] the doctrine of tenures’.76 Upon this analysis, ‘[a]bsolute and
beneficial Crown ownership, a plenum dominium, [is] established not by the
acquisition of radical title but by subsequent exercise of the authority of the
Crown’.77
For Gummow J, however, the contention that the grant of a lease by the
Crown necessarily involved the acquisition by the Crown of the ‘reversion
which is expectant upon the expiry of the term’ broke down when applied to
the statutory scheme for the disposition of Crown lands established by the
1910 Act. Gummow J noted that the phrase ‘[a]ll land in Queensland’ in s 4
of the 1910 Land Act Qld was apt to include land in respect of which the
76 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 186.
77 Id.
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Crown held radical title, and that by the two limbs of radical title, ‘the
common law enabled the Crown to grant interests in land to be held of the
Crown and to become absolute beneficial owner of unalienated land required
for the purposes of the Crown’.78 However, since all powers of alienation of
interests in land in Australia are now governed by statute, the State had to
justify its argument based on Brennan J’s reversion expectant dictum by its
adaptation to the statutory system for the disposition of land.
Thus, it was in the context of the statutory scheme for the disposition of
land that the postulate of the doctrine of tenure limb of radical title was, for
Gummow J, rendered otiose. The statute maintained a legal regime where, in
respect of what it identified as leases, there was no need for the creation in the
Crown of a reversionary estate out of which lesser estates might then be
granted.79 Rather, when the lease expired, the land again answered the
definition of ‘Crown Land’80 and was liable to be further dealt with by the
Crown.81 Gummow J also referred to the statutory provisions which abrogated
the common law requirement of entry for the creation of a reversion.82 Not
only did the statute operate effectively to vest interests granted under it in
advance of and without dependence upon entry,83 it also provided that, in the
case of forfeiture or other premature determination of a lease, the land would
revert to the Crown and become Crown land.84 For Gummow J, the fact that
the statute proceeded on a basis which was at odds with the common law
principles with respect to leases confirmed the conclusion that the term
‘revert’ in the statute was used to denote the ‘reassumption of the character of
“Crown Land” liable to further disposition’.85
It is important to note that while both Gaudron and Gummow JJ rejected the
notion that the interest acquired by the Crown at the expiration of the term of
the pastoral leases conferred beneficial ownership and was thus inconsistent
with native title, it is clear from Gaudron J’s judgment in Mabo86 and
Gummow J’s judgment in Yanner v Eaton87 that both justices regard the grant
of a common law lease as effecting the extinguishment of native title.
Nevertheless, it will be seen in the section on the ‘Implications for the legal
nature of the Crown’s title on the statutory grant of a common law lease’,88
that while the grant of a common law lease may extinguish native title on the
ground that the rights created by grant are inconsistent with native title rights,
78 Ibid, at CLR 188.
79 Ibid, at CLR 189.
80 Section 4.
81 Under s 6: Wik, above n 1, at CLR 189.
82 Section 6(2) and s 135: Wik, above n 1, at CLR 189, 198, 199.
83 Section 6(2).
84 Section 135. The expression ‘the land shall revert to His Majesty and become Crown Land,
and may be dealt with under this Act accordingly’ is used in s 135 in respect of
determination of either a pastoral lease or a licence before the expiration of the period or
term of the grant. Under the common law, however, determination of a licence would not
ordinarily be described as bringing about a reversion of the land to the licensor. See Wik,
above n 1, at CLR 199 per Gummow J.
85 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 189.
86 Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 110.
87 (1999) 201 CLR 351; 166 ALR 258 at [108].
88 See Part II, text accompanying n 6ff.
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this does not have any significance for the Crown’s title.89
(d) Kirby J
Although not expressly referring to the concomitant of sovereignty limb of
radical title, Kirby J’s treatment of the ‘reversion expectant’ theory is
consistent with Gummow J’s. Referring to the critical passage in the reasoning
of Brennan J inMabo, Kirby J observed that Brennan J implied that it was not
the grant of the lease which had the effect of expanding the Crown’s title ‘from
mere radical title’ to a ‘plenum dominium’, but the acquisition of the reversion
expectant on the expiry of the leasehold term.90 Kirby J explained, however,
that the grant of leases is regulated by the Land Acts91 and that these Acts do
not expressly confer on the Crown the estate necessary to grant a lease.92 The
historical reason for this was clear: the enactments were based upon the
assumption that the Crown exclusively enjoyed the power to grant leasehold
and other interests simply as an attribute of its sovereignty. Since Mabo,
however, it was clear that with sovereignty came no more than radical title
which was burdened with native title.93
Consequently, Kirby J was of the view that to:
invent the notion, not sustained by the actual language of the Land Acts, that the
power conferred on the Crown to grant a pastoral leasehold interest was an indirect
way of conferring on the Crown ‘ownership’ of the land by means of the reversion
expectant [involved] a highly artificial importation of feudal notions into Australian
legislation.94
According to Kirby J, therefore, rather than inventing such a purpose, by a
new legal fiction, and retrospectively attributing it to the Queensland
Parliament so that it could be read into the Land Acts in order to afford the
estate out of which the Crown might grant a pastoral lease, the fact that the
parliament had said that the Crown’s power to make such a grant existed was
sufficient.95 Kirby J was of the view that to import into the Land Acts notions
of the common law apt for the tenurial holdings under the Crown and attribute
them to the Crown itself ‘piles fiction upon fiction’ and, unless expressed in
the legislation, should not be introduced.96 Thus, like the other members of the
majority, Kirby J equates Crown land under the Land Acts with mere radical
title.
(e) Summary
Three distinct approaches vis-a`-vis the role and content of a reversion in the
context of statutory grants emerge from the majority judgments in Wik: one
from Toohey J, one from Gaudron J, and one from Gummow and Kirby JJ.
These approaches correspond with the underlying rationales adopted by these
89 Ibid, text accompanying nn 13–17.
90 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 235. This required legal analysis of the consequences of the exercise
of sovereign rights in respect of each dealing in land.
91 Ibid, at CLR 244.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Ibid, at CLR 244–5.
96 Ibid, at CLR 245.
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judges. Furthermore, the rationales underlying the judges’ decisions reflect
their views on the role of the redefined doctrine of tenure in the context of
statutory grants.
By combining arguments based upon the two limbs of radical title, Toohey J
accepts that the redefined doctrine of tenure applies in the context of statutory
grants. That is, although a reversion is implied as a result of the fiction of
original Crown ownership, such reversion does not confer full beneficial
ownership. In contrast, by focusing exclusively on the concomitant of
sovereignty limb of radical title, both Kirby and Gummow JJ deny that the
redefined doctrine of tenure has any role in the context of statutory grants.
That is, the fiction of original Crown ownership is not invoked to supply a
reversionary interest.
Although Gaudron J also rejects a narrow approach based upon the
application of the doctrine of tenure on the facts of Wik, she nevertheless
suggests that the doctrine of tenure might apply to confer beneficial ownership
in respect of interests created by statute where those interests are given their
content by the common law. Significantly, unlike the other members of the
majority, the rationale underlying Gaudron J’s decision was not based on
either or both limbs of radical title. Indeed, instead of focusing on the nature
of the Crown’s title, it was based upon the nature of the interest granted.
To date, there has not been any binding High Court decision on the
implications for the Crown’s title of the grant of a common law lease.97 It is
in this context, therefore, that the rationales underlying the judges’ decisions
are crucial. Although the High Court was dealing with the statutory grant of
an interest not given its content by the common law, it will be seen, in
Part II,98 that these rationales indicate how the justices might resolve the legal
implications, for the Crown’s title, of the grant of other interests in land,
including the grant of a true common law lease. Although Kirby and
Gummow JJ’s approach represents a majority of the majority in Wik and the
most radical departure from the doctrine of tenure in the context of statutory
grants, the minority’s analysis remains potentially influential. This is because
the concept of radical title (and its expansion or otherwise) arose for
reconsideration in Wik as a result of the court’s examination of the
consequences for native title of the expiration of a pastoral lease, namely,
whether native title rights were thereby extinguished permanently or whether
such rights were merely suspended.99 Because of their finding that native title
had survived the grant of the pastoral leases, this question was not strictly
necessary for the majority to decide. Brennan CJ’s interpretation of radical
title and the results of its exercise were, however, decisive to his conclusion,
97 Although the majority of the High Court in Ward, above n 4, at [369]–[372] held that a
common law lease extinguished native title, this was based upon the court’s application of
the inconsistency of incidents test for the purposes of the NTA, rather than upon an
expansion of the Crown’s radical title at common law. Thus, the question of the nature of the
Crown’s reversion, if any, was not addressed: see Part II, text accompanying nn 57–61,
136–148.
98 See Part II, text accompanying n 6ff.
99 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 132–3 per Toohey J’s postscript added with the concurrence of the
other three majority judges. See also Bhuta, above n 46, p 33.
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on behalf of the minority, that the grant of a statutory leasehold interest
extinguished native title.100
It will be seen that, in contradistinction to Kirby and Gummow JJ and
Gaudron J’s decision on the facts, the minority, like Toohey J, unequivocally
assert that the doctrine of tenure does apply in the context of statutory grants.
Nevertheless, the minority treat a reversion in this context as equivalent to a
traditional common law reversion. This is, of course, one of the possible
consequences of Gaudron J’s suggestion that the doctrine of tenure might
apply to confer beneficial ownership in respect of interests created by statute
where those interests are given their content by the common law.
2 Minority judgment: Brennan CJ (Dawson and McHugh JJ
concurring)
Notwithstanding the different rationales adopted by the members of the
majority, they nonetheless rejected the reversion expectant argument, whereas
the minority unequivocally embraced it. Indeed, Brennan CJ’s reasoning, as
author of the minority judgment inWik, is logically consistent with his dictum
in Mabo concerning the Crown’s ‘reversion expectant’ on a lease granted by
the Crown.
Nevertheless, following Mabo it was not clear whether Brennan J regarded
radical title as merely a ‘bare title’ sufficient to support the doctrine of tenure
and the Crown’s acquisition of a plenary title, or as conferring rights of
beneficial ownership except to the extent of native title.101 In his endeavour to
sustain the reversion expectant theory in Wik, however, Brennan CJ suggested
that the view that radical title is essentially ‘a power of alienation controlled
by statute’102 cannot be accepted.103 His comments were, however, confined to
an examination of land that had been brought within the doctrine of tenure.104
In particular, his comments relate to the creation of a leasehold tenure.
Accordingly, not only is the Chief Justice’s judgment irrelevant to the question
of the meaning and content of radical title in respect of land which has not
been brought within the doctrine of tenure, since it represents the minority
view in Wik it is not authoritative in the context of land which has been
brought within the doctrine of tenure as a result of the grant of a pastoral lease
by the Crown.105
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice made some general observations on the
fundamental doctrine of tenure. His Honour asserted that by exercise of a
statutory power to alienate an estate in land, the Crown creates a tenure
between the Crown and the alienee and brings the land within the regime
100 Dawson and McHugh JJ concurring.
101 Cf Mabo, above n 2, at CLR 47–8 and 50–1. See also Secher, above n 2, Ch 3, p 126.
102 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 94.
103 Id. CF comments by Bartlett, above n 12, p 151. Cf also Wik, above n 1, at CLR 127, 128
per Toohey J (referred to in text accompanying n 49 above); 156 per Gaudron J (referred to
in text accompanying n 66 above) and 186, 189 per Gummow J (referred to in text
accompanying n 77 above); and see Kirby J at text accompanying n 96 above.
104 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 91.
105 The implications for the Crown’s title on the grant of a common law lease are considered in
Part II.
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governed by the doctrines of tenure and estates.106 For Brennan CJ it followed
that:
Once land is brought within [the] regime [governed by the doctrines of tenure and
estates], it is impossible to admit an interest which is not derived mediately or
immediately from a Crown grant or which is not carved out from either an estate or
the Crown’s reversionary title.107
Thus, the creation of a tenure, however limited the estate in the particular
parcel of land may be, establishes exhaustively the entire proprietary legal
interests which may be enjoyed in that parcel of land. If the interests alienated
by the Crown do not exhaust those interests, the remaining proprietary interest
must, therefore, be vested in the Crown.108 It has, however, already been seen
that, even under the feudal doctrine of tenure, the Crown was not in fact the
proprietor of all land for which no subject could show a title: where a freehold
in land became unowned because the tenant pur autre vie died before the
cestui que vie, the estate went to the first person to enter as occupant rather
than the Crown.109
Nevertheless, Brennan CJ declared that inAustralia, ‘the Crown takes either
by reversion on expiry of the interest granted or by escheat on failure of
persons to take an interest granted’.110 Noting that all powers of alienation of
interests in land in Australia are now governed by statute,111 Brennan CJ
asserted that, by exercise of a statutory power to alienate an estate in land, the
Crown creates a tenure in the strict common law sense of the term between the
Crown and the alienee. It followed, therefore, that ‘where a leasehold estate is
the only proprietary interest granted by the Crown in a parcel of land and the
lessee is in possession, a legal reversionary interest is the necessary
foundation for the existence of a right to forfeit for breach of condition’.112
Then comes his crucial passage:
It is only by treating the Crown, on exercise of the power of alienation of an estate,
as having the full legal reversionary interest that the fundamental doctrines of tenure
and estates can operate.113
Brennan CJ also referred to the provisions of the Land Act 1910 (Qld)114 in
order to support the Crown’s acquisition of a beneficial title on reversion. He
explained that at the time of the Act’s enactment, the common understanding
was that Crown grants were made out of the Crown’s proprietary title to all
106 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 91.
107 Id.
108 Ibid, at 90–1.
109 See Secher, above n 2, Ch 1, pp 29–30. Although an ordinary reversioner would have to
enter to merge the pur autre vie estate with his own, there was an exception where the
Crown was the reversioner: see the authorities cited by McNeil, above n 29, p 12 n 20; see
also p 80 n 4.
110 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 91.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Ibid, at CLR 93.
114 Pursuant to which pastoral leases had been granted by the Crown in 1915 and 1919.
Corresponding provisions appeared in the Land Act 1962 (Qld).
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land in the colony.115 No recognition was accorded by Australian courts to the
existence of native title in or over land in Australia.116 Consequently, the
provisions of the Act did not admit of any interest in land subject to a pastoral
lease being held by any person other than the Crown, the lessee and persons
taking an interest under the lease.117 It was, therefore, impossible that the
parliament might have intended that any person other than the Crown should
have any reversionary interest in such land.118Although dealing with a statute,
Brennan CJ was of the view that the Act treated the Crown as having not only
the power to grant a lease, but as having the full beneficial reversionary
interest which, under the feudal doctrines of the common law, a lessor had to
possess in order to support and enforce the relationship of landlord and
tenant.119
3 Summary
For Brennan CJ, it was only by treating the Crown, on exercise of the power
of alienation of an estate (statutory or otherwise), as having the full legal
reversionary interest that the fundamental doctrines of tenure and estates could
operate.120 This is significant because it indicates not only the point of
divergence between his decision and both Gummow and Kirby JJ’s decision
and Gaudron J’s decision on the facts, but also the point of possible
reconciliation between his decision and both Toohey J’s decision and
Gaudron J’s suggestion that the doctrine of tenure might apply in some
circumstances in the context of statutory grants.
By focusing on the creation of a tenure by exercise of a power to alienate
an estate in land, Brennan CJ’s explanation, like that of the majority, accepts
that the doctrine of tenure, in its application to land in Australia at common
law, only applies to every Crown grant of an interest in land. As a corollary,
the fiction associated with the doctrine of tenure also only applies to every
Crown grant of an interest in land. It would appear, therefore, that all the
members of the High Court in Wik agree that, at common law, where a
leasehold estate is the only proprietary interest granted by the Crown in a
parcel of land, a legal reversionary interest must be vested in the Crown in
order to support and enforce the relationship of landlord and tenant.121 Where
the Crown does not have an actual title to the relevant land, such reversionary
interest will be supplied by virtue of the application of the fiction of original
Crown ownership in respect of the particular Crown grant.
Although this would be the effect of investiture of radical title at common
law,122 Gummow and Kirby JJ considered that such a fictional reversionary
interest was unnecessary in the case of a statutory alienation; that is, the fiction
of original ownership is otiose in the context of statutory grants. Gaudron J’s
decision on the facts of Wik also rejected a common law reversionary interest.
115 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 92.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Ibid, at CLR 93.
120 Id.
121 Ibid, at CLR 91, 93.
122 See text accompanying nn 23–27 above.
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This aspect of Gaudron J’s decision and the position taken by Gummow and
Kirby JJ is, therefore, the very antithesis of Brennan CJ’s decision. On the
other hand, Gaudron J’s suggestion that the common law doctrine of reversion
might apply in respect of interests created by statute where those interests are
given their content by the common law, and Toohey J’s treatment of the
doctrine of tenure in the context of statutory grants, are not too dissimilar to
the Chief Justice’s analysis: for all three judges a reversion was created.
Nevertheless, Brennan CJ’s analysis departs from that of Toohey J by
attributing to the Crown a reversionary interest which conferred full beneficial
ownership. In this way, it appears that the Chief Justice’s decision aligns most
closely with Gaudron J’s obiter. However, apart from disagreeing with
Gaudron J’s decision on the facts, Brennan CJ’s decision also departs from
Gaudron J’s by focusing on the expansion of the Crown’s interest rather than
the interest granted. Indeed, by transposing the doctrine of tenure into the law
relating to statutory grants, the rationale underlying Brennan CJ’s decision is
analogous to that underlying Toohey J’s decision. Unlike Toohey J, however,
Brennan CJ failed to distinguish between the effect of the fiction of original
Crown ownership under the feudal and redefined doctrines of tenure. Thus,
‘the “received idea of feudalism” continues to exert the force of law, in
abstracto, over Brennan CJ’s judgment’.123
Indeed, while the majority reject a narrow approach based upon the feudal
notion that the grant by the Crown of an interest in land upon its radical title
is dependent upon, and can flow from nothing less than, absolute beneficial
ownership by the Crown,124 the minority accept (or at least appear to accept)
such an approach. Although the four members of the majority in Wik adopt
three distinct approaches when examining Brennan J’s ‘reversion expectant’
dictum, they were essentially of the view that either the fiction of original
Crown ownership did not apply in the context of statutory grants or, if it did,
it conferred no more than a nominal proprietary interest sufficient to support
the lease. Furthermore, despite Gaudron J’s suggestion that a statutory
reversion can, in some circumstances, have the traditional common law
meaning, it is clear that the majority were of the view that the Crown’s
undoubted power of alienation of land is not dependent upon beneficial
ownership of the land. Thus, for the majority, the grant of a pastoral lease was
no more than an exercise of statutory power conferring statutory rights, having
no significance for the Crown’s beneficial interest in the land granted.
Although the majority’s decision emphasised the statutory nature of the
relevant pastoral leases, at least two members of the majority (Toohey and
Gummow JJ)125 were of the view that a similar result would be achieved by
reference to the common law. That is, since they regarded radical title as not,
123 Bhuta, above n 46, p 35.
124 Indeed, it has been seen that although this was Gaudron J’s decision on the facts in Wik, she
nevertheless suggested that a reversion conferring beneficial ownership might apply in
respect of interests created by statute where those interests are given their content by the
common law. Thus, in such circumstances, Gaudron J, like the minority, accepted the view
that an interest granted by the Crown is dependent upon and can flow from nothing less than
absolute beneficial ownership by the Crown.
125 See text accompanying nn 49 and 77 above respectively. Kirby J is also, arguably, of this
view: see text accompanying n 96 above.
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of itself, carrying beneficial ownership, the analysis, based upon general
common law principles, of the High Court’s identification of the two limbs of
radical title is apposite: post-Mabo, the meaning of reversion in the context of
a leasehold estate granted out of land in respect of which the Crown has a
mere radical title means the resumption of mere radical title.126
For the minority, however, the application of the doctrine of tenure in the
context of an exercise of the statutory, or common law, power of alienation of
a pastoral leasehold estate meant that the fiction of original Crown ownership
not only supplied a reversionary interest but also conferred beneficial
ownership.
Although Brennan CJ’s decision and Gaudron J’s obiter appear to support
the orthodox, albeit incorrect, understanding of the notion of radical title as
declared by the Privy Council, viz the view that the Crown’s ownership of all
land subject to the burden of native title vested upon settlement,127 it is by no
means so clear. There is an important objection to their approach: they
misconstrue the effect, at common law, of the doctrine of tenure and its
associated fiction of original Crown ownership. While the Crown’s fictional
reversionary interest, supplied by the fiction of original Crown ownership, was
deemed to confer beneficial title under the feudal doctrine of tenure, under the
redefined doctrine of tenure, such a ‘fictional’ reversionary interest, although
still supplied by the fiction of original Crown ownership, only supplies a
nominal proprietary interest to support the lease granted for the duration of its
term.128
It is because the minority’s decision and Gaudron J’s obiter treat the
Crown’s ‘fictional’ reversionary interest as continuing despite the expiration
of the lease that their reasoning coheres with the traditional meaning given to
‘reversion’.129 Thus, it is suggested that both judges adhere to the
interpretation of radical title as a bare legal title sufficient to support the
doctrine of tenure and the Crown’s acquisition of a plenary title: the
conclusion that, on the grant of a leasehold estate based on the Crown’s radical
title, the Crown acquires a traditional common law reversionary interest, is
simply the result of applying the fiction associated with the doctrine of tenure
beyond its purpose.
Indeed, it will be seen in the next section, that Brennan CJ’s approach, as
well as that adopted by all members of the majority, in relation to the
extinguishment of native title by Crown grant is inconsistent with the view
that simply because the fiction of original Crown ownership applies whenever
the Crown grants an interest in land relying upon its radical title, the Crown
thereby acquires beneficial ownership of the land. Indeed, there is a distinction
between the effect on native title of a real title and the effect on native title of
the Crown’s fictional title.
126 See section headed ‘The Two Limbs of Radical Title: Common Law Implications for the
“Reversion Expectant” Argument’, text accompanying n 12 above.
127 See, generally, U Secher, ‘The Meaning of Radical Title: The Pre-Mabo Authorities
Explained — Part I’ (2005) 11 (3) APLJ 179–208.
128 See text accompanying nn 25–27 and paragraph immediately before n 37 above.
129 See, generally, Re Mercer v Moore (1880) 14 Ch D 287, esp at 295. See also In re
Strathblaine Estates Ltd [1948] Ch 228 at 231 per Jenkins J.
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C Extinguishment of native title by Crown grant
1 Brennan CJ (as author of the minority)
The conclusion that the Crown did acquire a beneficial reversion was one
reason which led the minority in Wik to reject the argument that native title
rights and interests had been suspended for the term of the pastoral leases.
That is, the holding that a legal reversionary interest must be vested in the
Crown, was reached in the context of examining the question whether the
issuing of the relevant pastoral leases extinguished native title permanently or
merely suspended it for the duration of the leases.130 This was because
Brennan CJ had already held that the grant of the leases had extinguished the
native title: since they conferred a right of exclusive possession on the lessees
which was inconsistent with native title, the lessees’ rights prevailed over the
rights of the holders of native title.131 In other words, pursuant to the common
law doctrine of extinguishment by Crown grant, the grant of the leases had the
extinguishing effect on native title.
By focusing on the expansion of the Crown’s title, rather than the interest
granted, however, both Brennan CJ’s reversion expectant dictum and his
dictum to the effect that the Crown grant of any estate in land confers full
beneficial ownership on the Crown, suggest that the grant of any estate, and
in particular any lease, necessarily extinguishes native title, irrespective of
whether or not the grant of the interest is otherwise inconsistent with native
title.132 This produces an anomaly: if the Crown’s title necessarily expands
from radical to beneficial title whenever the Crown exercises the right to grant
tenure in land (on the ground that the grant of any interest in land is dependent
upon and can flow from nothing less than full beneficial ownership), then
native title is necessarily extinguished by the grant of any interest in land and
there is no need for an independent test of extinguishment based upon
inconsistency between the grantee’s rights and native title rights.
Although the relevant leases did, in Brennan CJ’s view, confer exclusive
possession and were therefore inconsistent with native title, Brennan CJ’s
reasoning blurs the distinction between extinguishment of native title because
of inconsistent Crown grant (that is, because the grantee’s title is inconsistent
with any native title) and extinguishment of native title because of Crown
acquisition of beneficial ownership (that is, because the Crown’s radical title
has expanded into a plenum dominium). In this context, Brennan CJ observed
that ‘[native] title is liable to be extinguished by laws enacted by, or with the
authority of, the legislature or by the act of the executive in exercise of powers
conferred upon it’.133 He then classified the laws or acts which are capable of
extinguishing native title as belonging to one of three categories:
(i) laws or acts which simply extinguish native title; (ii) laws or acts which create
rights in third parties in respect of a parcel of land subject to native title which are
130 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 88.
131 Id.
132 Ibid, at CLR 89; cf 92.
133 Ibid, at CLR 84.
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inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy native title; and (iii) laws or acts by
which the Crown acquires beneficial ownership of land previously subject to native
title.134
Extinguishment by pastoral lease came within the second of Brennan CJ’s
categories. For Brennan CJ, once the relevant act which is said to effect
extinguishment of native title is identified as a pastoral lease, ‘[t]he question
is . . . whether the right to exclusive possession conferred by the leases on the
pastoral lessees was inconsistent with the continued right of the holders of
native title to enjoy that title’.135 Thus, Brennan CJ’s formulation of the test
for extinguishment presupposes that the pastoral lessee acquired a right to
exclusive possession at the latest when the lease was issued, and, therefore,
that there was an inconsistency between that right and the right of any other
person to enter or to remain on the land demised without the lessee’s
consent.136 Where access to the land is an essential aspect of the native title
asserted, therefore, inconsistency arises because the rights of the lessee and
the rights of the native title holders cannot be fully exercised at the same
134 Ibid, at CLR 84–5.
A law or executive act which, though it creates no rights inconsistent with native title, is
said to have the purpose of extinguishing native title, does not have that effect ‘unless
there be a clear and plain intention to do so’. Such an intention is not to be collected by
inquiry into the state of mind of the legislators or of the executive officer but from the
words of the relevant law or from the nature of the executive act and of the power
supporting it. The test of intention to extinguish is an objective test.
Ibid, at CLR 85:
A law or executive act which creates rights in third parties inconsistent with a continued
right to enjoy native title extinguishes native title to the extent of the inconsistency,
irrespective of the intention of the legislature or the executive and whether or not the
legislature or the executive officer adverted to the existence of native title. . . . Third party
rights inconsistent with native title can be created by or with the authority of the
legislature in exercise of legislative power but, as the power of the State and Territory
legislatures is now confined by the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), a State or
Territory law made or an executive act done since that Act came into force cannot effect
extinguishment of native title if the law or executive act would not effect the
extinguishment of a title acquired otherwise than as native title.
Id. In respect of his third category, Brennan CJ said that the Crown may acquire a full
beneficial ownership that extinguishes native title by the acquisition of native title by or
under a statute: Id. In such a case, the ‘question is simply whether the power of acquisition
has been validly exercised’: ibid, at CLR 85—6. Alternatively, id:
[T]he Crown, without statutory authority, may have acquired beneficial ownership
simply by appropriating land in which no interest has been alienated by the Crown. (Such
an acquisition by the Crown in the right of a State or Territory would have occurred, if
at all, before the Racial Discrimination Act came into force). In the latter case, the
appropriation of the land gives rise to the Crown’s beneficial ownership only when the
land is actually used for some purpose inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of
native title: for example, by building a school or laying a pipeline. Until such a use takes
place, nothing has occurred that might affect the legal status quo. A mere reservation of
the land for the intended purpose, which does not create third party rights over the land,
does not alter the legal interests in the land, but the Crown’s exercise of its sovereign
power to use unalienated land for its own purposes extinguishes, partially or wholly,
native title in or over the land used.
135 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 86.
136 Id.
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time.137 Where, however, a native title holder has only a non-accessory right,
there may be no inconsistency between that right and the right of the pastoral
lessee.138
According to Brennan CJ, the question of extinguishment of native title by
a grant of inconsistent rights must be resolved as a matter of law, not of fact.139
While the law can attribute priority to one right over another right in respect
of the same parcel of land, it cannot recognise the co-existence in different
hands of two rights that cannot both be exercised at the same time.140 For the
purpose of enabling the law to determine the priority of rights in respect of the
same parcel of land, the test of inconsistency must be between the rights
themselves and not the manner of their exercise.141 For Brennan CJ, therefore,
inconsistency will arise, or not, from the moment a pastoral lease is granted.142
Although Brennan J’s reversion expectant dictum inMabo suggests that the
Crown acquires a ‘plenum dominium’ when the term of a lease expires, it has
been seen that a reversion is an existing interest, albeit vested in interest, and
thus any plenary title would have to exist at the start of the lease.143 Indeed,
Brennan CJ’s further comments inWik suggesting that the Crown grant of any
estate in land confers beneficial ownership on the Crown treats the Crown as
having a full legal reversionary interest on exercise of the power of alienation
of an estate. Thus, the legal position with respect to the Crown’s title upon the
grant of any estate in land (in particular a lease) renders his test for
extinguishment by Crown grant obsolete: if the Crown has beneficial
ownership from the moment a pastoral lease is granted, any native title rights
would necessarily be extinguished and there can be no question of
inconsistency between the lessee’s rights and native title rights.
Furthermore, although there are a number of ways in which the Crown can
acquire beneficial ownership of land within the third category of laws liable
to extinguish native title identified by Brennan CJ, a full beneficial reversion
on the grant of a lease under the doctrine of tenure (feudal or redefined) would
be supplied by the fiction of original Crown ownership. It would not,
therefore, be a real title. This is crucial; when considering the effect, at
common law, of the two limbs of radical title, the question was raised: since
the essence of Mabo lies in saying that the Crown’s fictional title cannot
preclude the existence of native title, why could such a fictional title
extinguish native title?144 It was submitted that native title is only liable to be
extinguished by a real, not fictional, title. Indeed, although the fiction of
original Crown ownership does not confer a beneficial title on the Crown, it
does allow derivative title to pass to the grantee.
In this way, although the rights that a particular estate confers on a Crown
137 Id.
138 Ibid, at CLR 87.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. Otherwise the law would be incapable of settling a dispute between the holders of the
inconsistent rights prior to their exercise.
142 Id: ‘If the rights conferred on the lessee of a pastoral lease are, at the moment when those
rights are conferred, inconsistent with a continued right to enjoy native title, native title is
extinguished’.
143 See text accompanying n 28ff above.
144 See text accompanying n 16ff above.
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grantee may be inconsistent with the continuance of any native title rights and,
to the extent of that inconsistency, extinguish the native title rights, the
invocation of the fiction of original Crown ownership whenever the Crown
grants an interest in land cannot affect native title. Native title is, therefore,
extinguished as a result of the operation of the doctrine of estates, not the
doctrine of tenure.145 Where the Crown appropriates land to itself, however,
the Crown’s acquisition of a beneficial title will have the effect of
extinguishing native title; in such a case, the beneficial title of the Crown is
real, it is not supplied by virtue of the fiction of original Crown ownership.
As already noted, the nature of the Crown’s reversionary title was
considered in the context of the question whether extinguishment of native
title by the grant of the leases meant that the native title ceased permanently
or was merely suspended during the currency of the lease.146 That is, although
the native title had been extinguished as a result of the application of the
doctrine of extinguishment by Crown grant, the nature of the Crown’s
reversion established whether extinguishment was permanent or temporary. In
rejecting the argument that native title can revive upon the determination of a
pastoral lease, Brennan CJ rejected the contention that a pastoral lease is
merely a bundle of statutory rights147 which has no significance for the
Crown’s beneficial interest in the land granted so that, when the lease
determines, the Crown has no reversionary interest but only its original radical
title burdened by the native title.148 His Honour suggested that if this were not
correct, then the underlying or residual common law title (beneficial interest
in the land) would presumably subsist in the holders of native title.149 Such a
theory would, however, be inconsistent with the fundamental doctrines of the
common law and ‘it would equate native title with an estate in fee simple
which, ex hypothesi, it is not’.150 Brennan CJ concluded, therefore, that
‘where a leasehold estate is the only proprietary interest granted by the Crown
in a parcel of land . . . a legal reversionary interest must be vested in the
Crown’.151
The important point for present purposes is that, for Brennan CJ, the effect
of the reversionary interest was that any native title which had been
extinguished by the grant of a pastoral lease ceased permanently and could not
145 See text in paragraph immediately following n 17 above. See also Secher, above n 2,
pp 207–8.
146 The appellants argued that the grant of a pastoral lease was no more than an exercise of a
statutory power conferring statutory rights, having no significance for the Crown’s beneficial
interest in the land demised. Viewed in this way, it was open to contend that native title is
merely suspended during the currency of a lease and, when the lease is determined, the
Crown has no reversionary interest but only its original radical title burdened by the native
title: Wik, above n 1, at CLR 89.
147 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 89. Brennan CJ observed that if pastoral leases were regarded as
‘bundles of statutory rights’ rather than an estate held of the Crown, ‘it would be equally
correct to treat a “grant in fee simple” not as the grant of a freehold estate held of the Crown
but merely as a larger bundle of statutory rights . . .’.
148 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 89.
149 Ibid, at CLR 89–90.
150 Ibid, at CLR 90. Indeed the majority of the High Court inWard has made it clear that ‘native
title rights and interests are allodial’: above n 4, at [331] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
Gummow and Hayne JJ (Kirby J substantially agreeing with the joint judgment).
151 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 91.
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be revived. His Honour did not suggest that any unextinguished native title
was extinguished as a result of the reversionary interest. In light of the
suggestion that native title is only liable to be extinguished by a real, rather
than fictional, title, Brennan CJ’s reasoning indicates that there is distinction
between initial extinguishment by a real title and non-revival of extinguished
title by a fictional title. That is, although a fictional title can prevent
extinguished title from reviving, it cannot extinguish native title per se.152
Indeed, it will be seen that, in light of their conclusion on the reversion
expectant argument, the Wik majority’s treatment of the doctrine of
extinguishment by Crown grant leaves open the possibility that native title
might be temporarily suspended, rather than permanently extinguished, as a
result of the grant of a lease.153 That is, where the Crown grants a leasehold
estate based upon its radical title, although native title may be ‘extinguished’
on the ground of inconsistency with a particular lessee’s rights, since the
reversion, if a reversion applies at all, does not confer beneficial ownership on
the Crown, the Crown does not automatically assume beneficial ownership of
the land when the lease expires. Put another way, although native title in
respect of land is necessarily extinguished if the Crown’s radical title to that
land is converted into beneficial ownership, it does not automatically follow
that the Crown acquires a plenary title to the land if native title is extinguished
on the ground of inconsistency with the lessee’s statutory rights.154
Nevertheless, because the trial judge had not made any findings as to the
rights making up native title, the majority were unable to determine whether
the native title rights and the rights granted under the pastoral leases were
inconsistent. Accordingly, they held that native title was not necessarily
extinguished by the grant of the pastoral leases. Although the individual
majority judgments had made it clear that because of this decision they did not
need to consider the question of suspension, the postscript to Toohey J’s
judgment confirmed this.155 The point of present importance, however, is the
majority’s conclusion that the Crown did not acquire a full beneficial reversion
152 Furthermore, it is suggested that, in the event that native title to certain land is extinguished,
the former native title holders might be able to prove a customary law title to the land which,
like other common law titles, is not as vulnerable to extinguishment by executive act as
native title: see Secher, above n 2, Ch 9. For a discussion of the difference between native
title and common law title in terms of vulnerability to extinguishment, see Secher, above n 2,
Ch 3, pp 164–6 and Ch 7, pp 421–2.
153 Indeed, it will be seen in Part II, that there is considerable judicial support for a common law
concept of suspension of native title rights on the grant of a lease. In particular it will be seen
that in Ward, the trial judge, Lee J (1998) 159 ALR 483 and the dissenting Federal Court
judge on appeal, North J (2000) 99 FCR 316; 170 ALR 159 interpreted the majority
judgments in Wik to support a common law concept of suspension of native title rights on
the grant of a lease. Although the Ward High Court rejected any common law doctrine of
suspension, it will be seen that the court’s treatment of this issue is merely obiter.
154 It is in this context that Toohey J’s comments, in particular, question the generally accepted
view that extinguishment connotes a permanent cessation of rights or at least that they are
permanently rendered unenforceable. It will be seen, in Part II, that although the majority of
the High Court in Ward, above n 4, rejected a common law doctrine of suspension, such
rejection was merely obiter. Furthermore, while the Ward High Court acknowledged that the
NTA embodies a statutory concept of suspension, the reason given for distinguishing a
common law doctrine of suspension from its statutory counterpart is, with respect, erroneous
and thus open to criticism.
155 Wik, above n 1, at CLR 133: ‘Once the conclusion is reached that there is no necessary
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upon the grant of a pastoral lease based on its radical title.
Nevertheless, the High Court in Wik made it clear that the pastoral leases in
question were not leases in the common law sense. What are the implications,
therefore, for the Crown’s title, of the High Court’s treatment of the reversion
expectant argument in the context of the grant of a common law lease? It is
to this issue that we turn in Part II.
extinguishment by reason of the grants, the possibility of the existence of concurrent rights
precludes any further question arising in the appeals as to the suspension of any native title
rights during the currency of the grants’.
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